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Plaintiffs-Appellants Ryan McFarland and Kathryn McFarland ("Mr. and Mrs.
McFarland" or, "the McFarlands"), by and through their attorneys of record, McFarland Ritter
PLLC, respectfully file this Appellant's Brief in support of their appeal of the District Court's
February 8, 2018 Final Judgment in favor of Defendant-Respondent Liberty Insurance
Corporation ("Liberty").

I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A

Nature of the Case

Mr. and Mrs. McFarland have owned vacation property (the "Cabin") in Boise County,
Idaho since 2010. Until recently, the Cabin had been continuously insured by Liberty. The
McFarlands renewed the homeowners' insurance policy on an annual basis and always paid the
required policy premiums timely and in full.
When Mrs. McFarland originally contacted Liberty to apply for insurance coverage, she
described the Cabin as being heated by geothermal water, and consisting of a main house and a
detached garage (the "Garage") with a bedroom (the "Bonus Room") above the Garage. Mrs.
McFarland explained that the Bonus Room contained a bed and a couch, and that the Garage and
Bonus Room were part of the dwelling. With this specific understanding of the McFarlands'
property, Liberty issued the McFarlands a policy (the "Policy"), with an insurance limit of
$188,500.00 on the "Dwelling" and a limit of $22,350.00 on all "Other Structures."
In February 2017, while the McFarlands were absent from the Cabin, a geothermal
radiant heater failed in the Bonus Room. Because no one was present at the Cabin when the
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heater failed, extremely hot water spewed, unabated, out of the failed heater for approximately
two days, completely saturating the floor and lower walls of the Bonus Room and destroying the
ceiling and interior walls of the Garage below.
Immediately after discovering the deluge and shutting off the water, Mr. McFarland
contacted Liberty and filed a claim (the "Claim"). Liberty's claims agent stated that because the
Cabin was remote, she could not recommend any service providers; instead, the claims agent
instructed Mr. McFarland to find his own professionals to assist in remediation of the water
damage and the repairs. Mr. McFarland did so, and then that water remediation company
("ServPro") and Mr. McFarland together contacted Liberty to (i) obtain approval to use a
generator and drying and heating equipment, and (ii) outline the remediation process. Liberty's
claims agent approved of the proposed actions, and Mr. McFarland, ServPro and a plumber went
to work.
After the remediation work was fully performed, and while Mr. McFarland was obtaining
repair bids, another claims agent contacted Mr. McFarland and stated that Liberty would not pay
the entire remediation costs, even though Liberty had pre-approved the remediation plan.
Liberty's agent further stated that Liberty would not pay for all of the repairs to the Cabin. The
basis for Liberty's position was that the Garage and Bonus Room were subject to the lower
"Other Structures" policy limit, not the "Dwelling" policy limit.
Liberty's attempt to apply the lower "Other Structures" policy limits to the Claim
constitutes a breach of the Policy. Because the terms of the Policy are clear and unambiguous
that the applicable coverage is the higher "Dwelling" coverage, the District Court should have
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granted summary judgment in favor of the McFarlands. At worst, the terms of the Policy are
ambiguous as to which coverage applies, in which case the District Court should have construed
the Policy in favor of the McFarlands. The only way the District Court could have granted
summary judgment for Liberty - and, indeed, the path that the District Court did take - was to
erroneously find that the Policy unambiguously supports Liberty's coverage determination. The
District Court's decision constitutes an error of law which should be reversed on appeal.

R
1.

Course of Proceedings
On July 10, 2017, the McFarlands filed their Complaint for breach of contract,

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, bad faith, violation of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act, and unjust enrichment. R., pp. 6-99.
2.

On August 11, 2017, Liberty filed its Answer. R., pp. 100-10.

3.

On September 26, 2017, the McFarlands filed a Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment on their breach of contract claim only.
4.

On October 12, 2017, Liberty filed a cross motion for summary judgment on all

of the McFarlands claims. R., pp. 216-17.
5.

On November 13, 2017, the District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and

Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, in which the District Court denied the
McFarlands' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and granted Liberty's cross motion for
summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, finding that Liberty correctly applied the
lesser coverage limit under the "Other Structures" portion of the Policy. R., pp. 264-74. The
District Court denied the remainder of Liberty's motion for summary judgment. Id
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6.

On February 8, 2018 the District Court entered a "Final Judgment" in favor of

Liberty on the McFarlands' breach of contract claim. R., p. 284.
Also on February 8, 2018, the District Court issued a "Judgment" dismissing all

7.

of the McFarlands other claims without prejudice. R., p. 282.
8.

On February 14, 2018, the McFarlands filed a Notice of Appeal of the "Final

Judgment" on their breach of contract claim, initiating this above-captioned Appeal. R., pp. 28691.

C

Statement of Facts

1.

The McFarlands have owned the real property that is the subject of this above-

captioned Action, and improvements thereon, since 2010. R., p. 125.
2.

The dwelling on the Cabin property consists of a main house with a kitchen,

bathroom, and bedroom, and, just steps away, a detached Garage with the Bonus Room above it.
R., pp. 125-26.
3.

The Cabin property also contains a non-dwelling "other structure" that houses a

geothermal well. R., p. 126.
4.

In or about September 2010, Mrs. McFarland contacted Defendant via telephone

to inquire about purchasing a homeowner's insurance policy for the Property. R., p. 122. Mrs.
McFarland described the Cabin property to the Defendant's representative, and explained that
the dwelling includes a kitchen, bath and a bedroom, as well as the detached Garage and Bonus
Room. Mrs. McFarland also described the separate geothermal well structure. R., p. 122-23.
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5.

Until the water event giving rise to the Claim, Mr. and Mrs. McFarland furnished

the Bonus Room with a bed, couch, and two wing-backed chairs; the Garage housed a ping-pong
table, desk, books, clothing and other personal property. Both the Garage and Bonus Room were
heated and had lighting for continuous, protracted use as part of the dwelling. R., pp. 123, 126.
6.

Defendant issued the Policy to the McFarlands in 2010. R., p. 126.

7.

Since the Policy was issued, it has been renewed annually and Mr. and Mrs.

McFarland have always paid the premium timely and in full. R., p. 126.
8.

The version of the Policy in effect at the time of the Claim insured the "Dwelling"

up to a limit of $221,600.00 ("Coverage A"), and "Other Structures" up to $22,160.00
("Coverage B"). R., pp. 126, 177.
9.

The Policy does not define "dwelling;" instead, the Policy merely identifies it as a

location on the "Residence premises." R., p. 138. At best, the Policy defines "dwelling" in the
negative, by distinguishing it from "Other Structures," which are non-dwelling structures on the
property: "We cover other structures on the 'residence premises' set apart from the dwelling by
clear space." R., p. 139.
10.

The Cabin is heated by geothermal water, which is piped from the geothermal

well and ultimately through radiant heaters in the Garage and Bonus Room. R., p. 126.
11.

On or about February 15, 2017, the radiant heater in the Bonus Room failed,

resulting in 180-degree (approximately) water pouring onto the floor and walls of the Bonus
Room, and streaming onto the ceiling of the Garage below. No one was at the Property at the
time the heater burst, so for approximately two days voluminous amounts of water and steam
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destroyed the insulation, drywall, doors, overhead Garage doors, and plumbing and electrical
components of the Garage and Bonus Room. R., pp. 126-127.
12.

On February 17, 2017, Mr. McFarland discovered the failed radiant heater and

enormous water leak and immediately shut off the water, which meant the Cabin had neither heat
nor water. R., p. 127.
13.

Also on February 17, 2017, Mr. McFarland submitted the Claim to Defendant. R.,

14.

Defendant immediately admitted that the Claim was covered under the Policy,

p. 127.

and instructed Mr. McFarland to contact a disaster remediation company because Defendant did
not have a contract remediation company in the area. R., p. 127.
15.

On February 18, 2017, Mr. McFarland contacted ServPro to begin water

remediation efforts. R., p. 127. That same day, ServPro and Mr. McFarland jointly contacted
Defendant and obtained pre-approval to commence the remediation work. Defendant further
authorized ServPro to provide a power generator and portable heating and drying equipment to
the Property, and consented to Mr. McFarland hiring a plumbing professional to restore water
and heat to the Cabin while bypassing the damaged Garage and Bonus Room. Id. Mr.
McFarland, ServPro, and the plumber commenced work that day. Id
16.

On February 25, 2017, Defendant's contracted field adjuster inspected the

Property and told Mr. McFarland that the water damage to the Garage and Bonus Room was
quite extensive, and the Garage overhead doors and man-doors would need to be replaced. R., p.
127.
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17.

On or about March 8, 2017, Defendant issued partial payment to ServPro for

$10,261.14, and to the McFarlands in the amount of $13,206.36. R., p. 127. The amount paid to
ServPro did not satisfy all of ServPro's charges, but left a balance of$4,329.l 7 to be paid by the
McFarlands. Id.
18.

The amount paid to the McFarlands was not sufficient to repair the damages to the

Garage and Bonus Room. R., p. 129.
19.

On or about March 11, 2017, a claims agent for Defendant telephoned Mr.

McFarland to inform him that the applicable coverage limit for the structural damage under the
Claim was the lower limit applicable to "other Structures on Insured Location." R., p. 128.
20.

That same day, March 11, 2017, Mr. McFarland sent a letter to Defendant

demanding payment in full for the structural damages and repair work because the Garage and
Bonus Room are, in fact, part of the Cabin dwelling, as Mrs. McFarland had advised Defendant
at the time she applied for insurance. R., pp. 128.
21.

On March 14, 2017, Defendant's claims agent called Mr. McFarland to report that

Defendant was rejecting the McFarland's demand for full payment. R., p. 128.
II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The McFarlands assert that the issues on appeal are:
A.

Did the District Court err in holding that the term "Dwelling" in the Policy refers

to a singular structure?
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B.

Did the District Court err in finding that the damaged Garage and Bonus Room

are not part of the "Dwelling," as defined in the Policy?
C.

Alternatively, is the Policy ambiguous as to the meanings of "Dwelling" and

"Other Structure," requiring the Court to strictly construe the coverage limitations against
Liberty, and in favor of the McFarlands?

III.
ARGUMENT

A

Standard of Review
As set forth in this Court's decision in Tiller White, LLC v. Canyon Outdoor Media, LLC,

160 Idaho 417,419,374 P.3d 580, 582 (2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted):
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo,
and apply the same standard used by the district court in ruling on
the motion. The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment does not change the applicable standard of
review. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The facts must be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving
party. When both parties move for summary judgment, the trial
court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable
inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it
and grant the summary judgment despite the possibility of
conflicting inferences. The test for reviewing the inferences drawn
by the trial court is whether the record reasonably supports the
inferences.
In this case, the Parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the meaning of the Policy,
and the facts as they relate to this appeal are undisputed. Accordingly, the meaning of the Policy
is a question of law.
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R

The Plain Language of the Policy does not Limit the "Dwelling" to a Singular
Structure.

Determining the meaning of the language in an insurance policy is a question of law over
which Idaho courts exercise free review, "including whether an insurance policy is ambiguous."
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Schrock, 150 Idaho 817,821,252 P.3d 98, 102 (2011)

(internal citation omitted). If the language of an insurance policy is clear, then the language will
be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. ofIdaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho
415,419,234 P.3d 739, 743 (2010). That said, the "burden is on the insurer to use clear and
precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage." Moss v. Mic-America Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,300,647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982).

"Where a contract is clear and unambiguous, determination of the contract's meaning and
legal effect are questions of law to be decided by the court." Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v.
Idaho Transp. Dept., 109 Idaho 692, 695, 710 P.2d 602, 605 (1985); see also Suchan v. Suchan,

106 Idaho 654,660,682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984). In determining the meaning, a court cannot
"rewrite [the] contract[]" (Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219,223,220 P.3d 575, 579 (2009)),
"revise the contract" (Elliott v. Darwin Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 774, 779, 69 P.3d 1035, 1040
(2003)), "modify the express terms" (Lupis v. Peoples Mortg. Co., 107 Idaho 489,492,690 P.2d
944, 947 (Ct. App. 1984)), or "make for the parties better agreements than they themselves have
been satisfied to make, and by a process of interpretation relieve one of the parties from the
terms which he voluntarily consented to nor can courts interpret an agreement to mean
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something the contract does not itself contain" (J.R. Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104,
110, 350 P.2d 211,214 (1960)).
The portions of the Policy-which Liberty drafted- applicable to Mr. and Mrs.
McFarland's breach of contract claim do not, on their face, preclude considering the Garage and
Bonus Room part of the "dwelling":
•

The Policy Declarations states "Dwelling with Expanded Replacement Cost:
$188,500 1. R., p. 134.

•

"Dwelling" is not defined.

•

Section 1, Coverage A, references the dwelling as a location on the "residence
premises." R., p. 138.

•

The "Residence Premises" is defined as
a. The one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds; or

b. That part of any other building;
where you reside and which is shown as the "residence premises
in the Declarations." R., p. 138.
Because "Dwelling" is not defined in the Policy, the Court must look to the plain, ordinary
meaning of the term. See Kinsey, 234 P.3d 739, 743 (2010). The District Court cited MerriamWebster and Google, which define "dwelling" as '"shelter (such as a house) in which people
live;' 'a house, apartment, or other place ofresidence;' and 'a place where people live.' Thus, the
term dwelling is synonymous with house." R., p. 271. This plain, ordinary meaning applied to
the McFarlands' cabin makes the Garage and Bonus Room part of the "dwelling": prior to the
water damage, the Bonus Room above the Garage was furnished with a bed and couch so that

1 The

renewal policy in place at the time of the Claim listed the limit at $221,600.00. R., p. 177.
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family members could routinely occupy and sleep in that space. R., pp. 122-23, 125-26. The
Garage was regularly used as a recreational and work space and included Personal Property such
as a ping-pong table, desk, books and clothing. Id. Both the Garage and Bonus Room were
heated and had lighting for regular use as part of the dwelling. Id. The Garage and Bonus Room
were, in a word, a "dwelling" - or more accurately, part ofthe dwelling, which included the
main cabin. These facts are undisputed. They plainly show that the correct coverage limit for the
damages is $221,600.00.
Providing almost no explanation, the District Court concluded that the Garage and Bonus
Room could not be part of the dwelling, because the term "dwelling" must refer to "a singular
structure ... a singular dwelling." R., p. 271. The error in this reasoning is that the word
"singular" simply does not appear anywhere in the Policy, and neither do the terms "singular
structure" or "singular dwelling." Instead, the District Court simply inserted this language,
thereby impermissibly "modifiying] the express terms" of the Policy (Lupis, 690 P.2d at 947),
and interpreting the Policy "to mean something the contract does not itself contain." (JR.

Simplot Co., 350 P.2d at 214).
The District Court's erroneous conclusion that "dwelling" refers to a "singular structure"
appears to be informed by the District Court's analysis that the Garage and Bonus Room "do not
provide a means to cook and to bathe." The District Court does not explain why a necessary
condition of "dwelling" is that cooking and bathing facilities and all other "dwelling" rooms be
included in a "singular structure," and indeed there is nothing in fact or reason suggesting a
necessary connection. At least, neither the Policy nor Merriam-Webster nor Google require those
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elements. This Court can take notice that (i) before modem plumbing was implemented, many
dwellings had cooking and bathing facilities that were in a separate structure from other dwelling
rooms, and (ii) bedrooms and recreation rooms in many dwellings do not contain cooking or
bathing facilities, yet that does not make those rooms something other than part of the
"dwelling." So here. The "dwelling" consists of the main cabin (which has cooking and bathing
facilities) and the Garage and Bonus Room collectively, not any of them exclusively.
The fact that the Garage and Bonus Room do not contain cooking or bathing facilities is
irrelevant: the Garage and Bonus Room are part of the "dwelling" because the McFarlands
"dwell" there. Liberty takes exception to the fact that the McFarlands' "dwelling" includes two
structures, yet nothing in Liberty's own Policy prohibits this. More to the point, if Liberty
wanted to exclude the Garage and Bonus Room from the "Dwelling," it was incumbent upon
Liberty to do so in clear language in the Policy. Moss, 647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982).

C

Because the McFarlands Expressly Negotiated "Dwelling" Coverage for the
Garage and Bonus Room, the Garage and Bonus Room Are Subject to the
"Dwelling" Coverage Limits of the Policy.

Liberty's burden to make its Policy clear to exclude the Garage and Bonus Room for
"dwelling" coverage is even more apparent - and placing the burden on Liberty to do so is more
equitable - in light of the fact that the McFarlands expressly purchased insurance to cover the
Garage and Bonus Room as part of the "dwelling." Mrs. McFarland explicitly advised Liberty,
prior to buying insurance, that the Garage and Bonus Room were part of the dwelling and that
the McFarlands routinely "dwell" there. R., p. 122-23. The McFarlands also advised Liberty
prior to purchasing the Policy that there was one "other structure" on the property that is not part
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of the dwelling: the geothermal pump house. R., p. 123. Liberty issued the Policy with this actual
knowledge of the McFarlands' cabin.
Liberty has not disputed these facts. Because Liberty was on notice that the McFarlands
deemed the Garage and Bonus Room part of the dwelling, Liberty was required to make explicit
its intention to cover the Garage and Bonus Room differently than the rest of the dwelling - and
to be explicit in the language of the Policy, before the McFarlands made a claim, so that the
McFarlands could have an opportunity to purcha·se a different policy. Liberty did not do so;
instead, it issued the Policy, knowing of the McFarlands' expectations and usage of the Garage
and Bonus Room, and collected premiums for some six (6) years, and then not until the
McFarlands submitted their first and only claim did Liberty finally advise the McFarlands that
the Garage and Bonus Room were excluded from Coverage A.
As this Court has explained:
... most insurance policies are contracts of adhesion. Ordinarily
there can be no bargaining over the terms of the contract. The
buyer either accepts the policy as written or turns elsewhere where
he will usually be confronted with the same dilemma resulting
from the same terminology. If the layman actually studies the
contract he usually becomes bewildered and/or uncertain as to the
terminology. He expects that he will be generally insured and does
not anticipate these expectations will be upset by an artfully drawn
clause that the [sic] will be unable to detect or, in the event
detected, will be powerless to modify. Indeed, this court can take
notice that usually an insured never sees his policy until after he
has paid his premium and the contract has been formed.

Corgatelli v. Globe Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616,619,533 P.2d 737, 740 (1975). The
Corgatelli decision has been rejected to the extent it purported to adopt the "reasonable
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expectations" doctrine (see Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505,600 P.2d 1387 (1979)),
but this Court does not have to accept the "reasonable expectations" doctrine to again recognize,
as it did in Corgatelli, that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, and that the McFarlands
could not see the Policy until after they had paid the premium and entered the contract. Because
the McFarlands could not see the Policy before buying it, they did the next best thing: they
disclosed to Liberty that the Garage and Bonus Room were part of the dwelling and that the
Policy needed to provide adequate coverage for them. R., p. 122-23. Liberty purported to provide
that coverage, and never disclosed to the McFarlands that the Garage and Bonus Room were not
considered part of the "dwelling" until after the McFarlands filed the Claim. Liberty's
interpretation of the Policy excluding the Garage and the Bonus Room is contrary to the plain
language of the Policy, and is contrary to what Liberty and the McFarlands negotiated prior to
purchase of the Policy.

n

In the Alternative, the Definition of "Dwelling" is Ambiguous, and the District
Court Erred in Not Construing the Policy Against Liberty and in Favor of
Coverage of the McFarlands' Claims.

In the alternative, perhaps it is unclear to the Court whether the Garage and Bonus Room
are part of the "dwelling" or constitute an "other structure." Even in that event, Idaho case law is
clear that summary judgment should be entered against Liberty.
"To determine whether an insurance policy is ambiguous, the Court must first ask
whether the policy is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations." Schrock, 252 P.3d at 102
(internal citation omitted); Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. ofIdaho, 145 Idaho 459, 462, 180 P.3d
498, 501 (2008). As this Court has explained:
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If confronted with ambiguous language, the reviewing court must
determine what a reasonable person would understand the
language to mean. Furthermore, [b]ecause insurance policies are
contracts of adhesion that are not usually subject to negotiation
between the parties, any ambiguity in a policy is construed
strongly against the insurer. To this end, where language may be
given two meanings, one of which permits recovery while the
other does not, the policy should be given the construction most
favorable to the insured.

Schrock, 252 P .3d at 102 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations marks omitted); see
also Arreguin, 180 P.3d at 500 (a provision that seeks to exclude coverage must be strictly
construed in favor of insured).
The fact that the word "dwelling" is not defined in the Policy, when so many other terms
are, is significant. While "the mere fact that a term is undefined in a policy does not make that
term ambiguous if it has a settled legal meaning" (Melichar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 143
Idaho 716, 721, 152 P.3d 587, 592 (2007)), here there is no settled legal meaning of dwellingas perhaps best manifest by the fact that the District Court had to look outside the law to come up
with its own definition. R., p. 271. That vagueness makes the contract ambiguous, as this Court
held in Arreguin:
An additional indication of ambiguity in this particular contract is
that it defines many terms such as: aircraft, occurrence, residence
premises, and water, but does not define "outbuilding" anywhere
in the contract. See Moss, 103 Idaho at 301, 647 P.2d at 757
(noting that an indication of vagueness and ambiguity of the
undefined terms in question was that more than forty terms were
defined in the policy and thus address questions the insured might
have about coverage).
Furthermore, a provision excluding coverage is strictly construed
in favor of the insured and the insurer has the burden to use clear
and precise language if it is restricting the scope of its coverage.
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Moss, 103 Idaho at 300, 647 P.2d at 756. "[E]xclusions not stated
with specificity will not be presumed or inferred." Clark, 138
Idaho at 541, 66 P.3d at 245. If Farmers intended the
"Outbuildings" provision to exclude coverage for the detached
garage it could have simply used the word "garage" or similar
clear and precise language to that used when it defined the
"separate structures" covered under the contract.

Arreguin, 180 P.3d 498, 501 (2008). Here, the term "Dwelling" makes a $200,000 difference in
coverage: if a structure is a dwelling, it is entitled to $221,600.00 in coverage; if not, it is·entitled
only to 10% of that amount. That coverage/exclusion dichotomy is significant, and as Farmers
was required to do in Arreguin, Liberty Mutual here was required to define such a material term.
Liberty's failure to do so makes the term "Dwelling" ambiguous, and the Policy must be
construed in favor of Mr. and Mrs. McFarland.

Arreguin is an almost perfect analog to this instant case. Miguel Arreguin purchased a
homeowner's policy from Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho. Arreguin, 180 P.3d at 499.
Farmers subsequently inspected Arreguin's property and determined that the detached garage
should be excluded from coverage, so Farmers added an "outbuilding" exclusionary provision to
the policy, but nowhere in the policy was "outbuilding" defined. When Arreguin's detached
garage sustained damage from a fire, he submitted a claim on the policy which Farmers denied
based on its conclusion that the garage was an "outbuilding." Id. Arreguin sued Farmers for
breach of contract for failing to pay for the damage to his garage. On appeal, this Court reversed
the district court's summary judgment in favor of Farmers because it determined that
"outbuildings" was "reasonably subject to at least two differing interpretations and thus is
ambiguous." Id. at 462, 501. This Court held:
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We are compelled to strictly construe the exclusionary provision in
favor of the insured and the insurance company bears the burden to
use clear and precise language when restricting the scope of
coverage. It is unclear whether "outbuildings" covers the buildings
defined in separate structures or the attached structures defined
tmder dwelling. Unlike the other clear and detailed exclusionary
provisions, the 'Outbuildings" provision fails to reference any
other part of the contract. Therefore because Farmers has not met
its burden to use clear and precise language in this particular
exclusionary provision we hold the 'Outbuildings" exclusionary
provision is ambiguous and reverse the district court s grant of
summary judgment to Farmers.

Id. at 463, 502. Thus, this Court found that ambiguous coverage terms in an insurance policy
were to be construed broadly in favor of coverage of the insured's claim.
This Court's analysis and holding in Arreguin is directly applicable to this case. 2 Like
Farmers, Liberty insists that the coverage limit for "Other Structures" applies to Mr. and Mrs.
McFarland's Claim, but that determination is manifestly self-serving, and it is at least as likely more so, given that the McFarlands advised Liberty that the Garage and Bonus Room were part
of the dwelling before the Policy was issued - that the Garage and Bonus Room are part of the
"dwelling." If this Court determines that it is unclear whether the Garage and Bonus Room is
part of the "dwelling" or constitutes an "other structure," well-established case law, including

Arreguin, mandate that the Policy be strictly construed against the insurer (Liberty) and in favor
of the insured (Mr. and Mrs. McFarland) and coverage of the Claim.

Though, curiously, the District Court chose to ignore Arreguin altogether. The District Court
failed to even mention Arreguin, let alone distinguish it.

2
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IV.
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Mr. and Mrs. McFarland respectfully request that this Court
reverse the District Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor of Liberty and find that
the Policy limits applicable to the "Dwelling" apply to the Claim.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS _\_¢_ _ _ day of June 2018.

McFarland, ISB No. 7347
eys for Plaintiff
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